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absTraCT
The military coup on 25 April 1974 initiated the Carnation Revolution that put an 
end to the New State, the longest-lasting authoritarian regime in twentieth-century 
Europe. There are several alternative explanations about what caused such a proc-
ess of regime substitution in Portugal. This article focuses on one of them: military 
discontent and participation in politics. It analyses the history of civil-military rela-
tions from the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars until the demise of the New State. 
It shows that the attitude of the military in 1974 was not merely conjunctural and 
that the tendency to intervene in politics was entrenched in the armed forces since 
the fall of the ancien régime. Although the nature and intensity of its participa-
tion in state affairs evolved throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the 
Portuguese military never completely accepted civilian supremacy. Military inter-
ventionism was nurtured by political polarization, institutional weakness, and disa-
greements over foreign policy, the use of the armed forces against internal enemies 
and the deficient equipment and preparation of the troops. Periods of active involve-
ment in politics alternated with others in which interventionism remained latent.
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inTroduCTion
There are several competing interpretations about the driving forces that 
caused the downfall of the New State and initiated democratization in 
Portugal. Systemic deficiencies (Schmitter 1999), social movements (Chilcote 
2010; Santos 1998), international pressures (Telo 1999) and political elites 
(Reis 1994) can all be considered important elements for the demise of the 
dictatorial regime. However no account on the fall of the New State would 
be complete without taking into consideration the action of the armed forces. 
The role of the military in enabling the Carnation Revolution and guiding 
the political reforms during Portuguese transition has been sufficiently docu-
mented (Graham 1993; Porch 1977; Rezola 2006). This article shows that the 
coup of 25 April 1974 was not an isolated phenomenon exclusively produced 
by a set of contextual factors, as those mentioned above, but the latest expres-
sion of a long historical trend of military intervention in Portuguese politics.
History shows that the armed forces has often used its coercive power, 
esprit de corps, discipline and organizational capacity to influence, displace or 
supplant (de facto or de jure) civilian governments (Finer 1988 [1962]: 127). 
During times of political instability and institutional crisis, either on its own 
initiative or encouraged by other social actors, the military sometimes inter-
venes in politics. In the past, the Portuguese military has often attempted 
to shape political outcomes via military declarations, pronunciamentos or 
directly by overthrowing the government by force, such as the 25 April coup 
(Valério 2001: 814–31). This article revisits the history of military discontent 
and participation in Portugal through six distinctive stages from the end of 
the Napoleonic War until the Carnation Revolution. Although the motiva-
tions for intervening in politics evolved according to the political and ideo-
logical context (Ferreira 1992; Freire 2009) this article shows that the military 
in Portugal was never completely extricated from the political arena until the 
consolidation of democracy in the 1980s. The political polarization, the insti-
tutional weakness during regime changes, the armed forces’ role as guardians 
against the internal enemy, their precarious working conditions and disagree-
ments with the government’s foreign policy, were the most important propi-
tiatory factors for military interventionism.
The era of pronunciamentos
The intervention of the military to topple the New State cannot be discon-
nected from the long tradition of military intervention in politics in Portugal. 
This trend can be traced back to the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars which 
produced the end of absolutism, a power void and political turbulence, while 
increasing the prestige of the armed forces, thus opening a window of oppor-
tunity for military interventionism. The Liberal Revolution that resulted in the 
dismantling of the British protectorate led by General Beresford was set off by 
a military pronunciamento in 1820 (Santos 1990: 41). This rebellion, inspired by 
the American and French revolutions, as well as by the Spanish liberal consti-
tution of 1812, enabled the introduction of liberal principles and institutions, 
reflected in the 1822 constitution, and contributed to the consolidation of the 
bourgeoisie and the military as fundamental political actors (Gallagher 1983: 
13). Military coups and pronunciamentos became usual mechanisms of political 
action (Costa, Domingues and Monteiro 1989). The involvement of the mili-
tary in politics became so entrenched that from the enactment of the consti-
tution of 1822 until the foundation of the New State in 1933 a large majority 
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 1. Dom Miguel had led 
the abrilada absolutist 
military coup on 
30 April 1826 and been 
exiled afterwards. He 
swore the Constitution 
on 26 February, but 
on 23 July he declared 
himself absolute 
monarch. 
 2. Pereira Fontes de 
Melo was a soldier 
who headed the naval, 
treasury and industry 
ministries and later 
became prime minister 
(1871–77 and 1878–79).
of Portuguese prime ministers were military: 31 different military men led the 
government, several of them enjoying more than one mandate.
After the Liberal Revolution the military did not act as a cohesive institution. 
The opposing legitimacies of different pretenders to the throne and the pres-
sures from different political factions ended up dividing the military (Valente 
1997). King João VI died in 1826 without an heir. His successor Dom Pedro, 
Emperor of Brazil, unsuccessfully tried to reconcile the partisans of liberalism 
and absolutism by enacting a new constitution, the Charter of 1826. His abdi-
cation in 1828 gave way to civil war between the two factions. The absolutists 
supported the appointed regent, Dom Pedro’s brother, Dom Miguel, while the 
liberals backed Dom Pedro’s daughter and official heir, Dona Maria.1 In 1834 
Dom Miguel was defeated and Dona Maria II crowned queen. The end of the 
war did not mean the end of military involvement in politics. The tensions 
within the ranks provoked successive changes in the government and military 
command. One faction was loyal to the liberal constitution of 1822 (setembris-
tas) and another defended the principles of the more conservative Charter of 
1826 (cartistas). Many pronunciamentos took place, such as the Revolution of 
September 1836 that proclaimed again the 1822 constitution, the absolutist 
Marnotas Conspiracy (Conspiração das Marnotas) and the Marshall’s Revolt 
(Revolta dos Marechais) of 1837 that opposed the cartista Marshalls Saldanha 
and Terceira to the setembrista Marshall Sá da Bandeira. Moreover, there were 
up to twenty changes in the government from 1836 to 1842, many of them 
provoked by military pressures (Mascarenhas 1982: 260).
Military intervention in politics became very important after 1851 when 
Marshall Saldanha forced the resignation of the prime minister, Costa Cabral, 
who had been the most powerful figure in Portuguese politics since 1839 
(Santos 1989). Saldanha set in motion an ambitious project of regeneration 
for Portugal formalized in the Constitutional Reform (Acto Adicional) of 
1852. The reign of Pedro V (1853–61) was characterized by relative stabil-
ity favoured by the ambitious policies of investment in infrastructure and 
modernization launched by the powerful minister, Pereira Fontes de Melo 
(Torre Gómez and Sánchez Cervelló 2000: 43–47).2 The successor of Pedro V, 
Luis I, with the support of Marshall Sá da Bandeira, defeated a new military 
putsch commanded by Saldanha in 1870 (saldanhada). These two rival military 
leaders can be considered among the most important political figures in that 
period of Portuguese history due to their participation in most governments 
and pronuciamentos from the 1820s to the 1870s (Caeiro 1997: 49–61).
After 1870 the military gradually turned its attention away from inter-
nal politics and focused on their external enemies. Military satisfaction was 
favoured by the economic prosperity experienced by Portugal prior to 1888 
(Mata 1991: 757–58) and by the far-reaching reforms and budget increases 
implemented by Fontes de Melo (Mónica 1997: 739–40). The consolidation of 
the colonial possessions in Africa in the second half of the nineteenth century 
also contributed to military prestige and diverting the attention away from 
domestic politics. However, the colonial expansion also created new tensions 
and discontent within the ranks. In Africa, Portugal competed with the United 
Kingdom and Germany. In 1890 the British Empire set an ultimatum for 
Portugal with the aim of forcing it to abandon the aspiration of uniting the 
territories of Mozambique and Angola. This ultimatum and the acceptance of 
the conditions imposed by the British opened a period of governmental crisis 
and the emergence of nationalist and republican ideas in the armed forces 
(Antunes 1990: 24; Teixeira 1990; Rego 1966: 151, 228–30). In 1891 a group of 
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officers revolted in Oporto and attempted to establish a republic, imitating the 
proclamation of the Brazilian Republic in 1889. The rebellion failed and those 
involved were imprisoned or exiled. This was the last violent military interven-
tion during the nineteenth century in Portugal. Direct military participation 
in politics had diminished (Ferreira 1992: 29) but republican ideas persisted 
especially within secret societies such as the Carbonaria and Freemasons. The 
republican revolutionary cause gained supporters within the armed forces in 
particular among navy officers who thought the allocation of military resources 
by the monarchic governments was unfair (Ramos 1994: 379). The evolv-
ing socio-demographic composition of the increasingly middle-class officer’s 
corps can be also linked to the process of republicanization of the armed forces 
(Carrilho 1985: 124–26). The military again played an important role in the 
revolution that in 1910 deposed the last king of Portugal, Manuel II, and estab-
lished the Portuguese First Republic (Carvalho 2012: 147–84).
The PorTuguese firsT rePubliC and The miliTary 
diCTaTorshiP
The military had distanced itself from the traditional monarchic parties and 
did not support the latter when the republicans launched their coup (Valente 
1976: 95–7). The revolution began as a social movement, but the involvement 
of some groups of soldiers was important for its success (Carrilho 1985: 83–95). 
The Portuguese First Republic was politically very unstable, with 45 differ-
ent governments in sixteen years (Porch 1977: 18–19) and up to 21 different 
pronunciamentos and coups (Pabón 1942: 112). The military reform and purge of 
the monarchic officers by the war minister, Correia Barreto, in 1911 increased 
polarization within the ranks. The creation of the National Republican Guard 
(GNR – Guarda Nacional Republicana) in 1910 and the suspension of voting 
rights for soldiers in 1911 also became controversial measures (Caeiro 1997: 
95–96). The military was disillusioned by the sense of disorder and disunity in 
the new regime and increased its interventions. Some military endorsed the 
radical republican views defended by Afonso Costa while others embraced 
conservative republican or monarchic ideals. The action of secret societies and 
personal rivalries compounded the problem. The radical republican revolu-
tionary attempt in 1913 and the monarchist revolts of 1911, 1912, 1913 and 
1914 are some of the most important examples.
The beginning of the First World War in 1914 increased the instability, 
radicalization and politicization of the military. Portugal entered the war and 
more than 200,000 men were recruited, with nearly 100,000 sent to fight 
in either the European or African theatres. In addition to the thousands of 
casualties, the war effort was economically very costly and had an enormous 
impact on Portugal. The deficiencies of the Portuguese armed forces in terms 
of material means, preparation and discipline were revealed during their 
participation for the war (Ferreira 1992; Marques 2004). Portugal did not have 
the capacity to guarantee the defence of its territory through military means, 
and the colonial map did not allow further conquests. These factors contrib-
uted to the redefinition of the role of the military, with its mission redefined 
as guardians of domestic order, a sort of police that had to deal with radi-
cal political opposition movements and revolts, which made it more prone to 
intervention in politics (Welch 1987). In January 1915, a group of officers of 
different ideologies, grouped together as the Swords Movement (Movimento 
das Espadas) and led by Captain Martins de Lima forced the resignation of 
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 3. Some military were 
also close to the 
Reviralho, a very active 
republican opposition 
that attempted several 
plots against the 
military dictatorship 
and the Salazar regime 
up until the early 1940s 
(Farinha 1998).
the government and the appointment of General Pimenta de Castro as prime 
minister. Accused of dictatorial policies, the government was toppled by an 
armed revolution organized by the Democratic Party in May 1915 (Serrão and 
Marques 1987: 710; Wheeler 1979a: 111–25, 132–33).
In 1917 Major Sidónio Pais became prime minister via a military coup. He 
imposed a centralized personal system of control and instituted fundamental 
reforms to create an authoritarian new republic (república nova), the precursor 
of the New State. After the assassination of Sidónio Pais in December 1918 
and the attempt to restore the monarchy by a military revolt in Oporto in 1919 
a democratic government declared the return to the ‘old republic’. This period 
saw the emergence of new parties and politicians but the instability remained. 
The government strengthened the GNR as means to shield itself from armed 
intervention. However, in 1921 some officers of the GNR planned a revolu-
tionary movement and assassinated the prime minister, António Granjo, and 
some other important political and military leaders during the Noite Sangrenta 
(Bloody Night). Insurrections and terrorist attacks became commonplace. The 
financial crisis and political instability delegitimized the republican political 
parties in the eyes of many military and other societal actors.
After a failed coup attempt in April 1925, the republic was finally brought 
to an end by a nationalist and anti-parliamentary revolution on 28 May 1926 
(Carvalho 2012: 298–340). General Gomes da Costa revolted in Braga and 
marched into Lisbon to establish a military dictatorship (1926–33). Although 
initially the 28 May Revolution was ideologically very heterogeneous, the 
conservatives eventually prevailed (Antunes 1978: 122). After a series of inter-
nal struggles, General Antonio Oscar de Fragoso Carmona forced the resigna-
tion of Gomes da Costa and assumed the Presidency of the Republic (Santos 
1990: 400).3 Carmona was confirmed in office by the presidential elections 
of 1928 and appointed a university professor, António de Oliveira Salazar, 
as finance minister. Salazar requested special powers to tackle the economic 
problems Portugal was suffering. The initial success of his reforms coupled 
with the extended perception that the military would be incapable of resolving 
the crisis by themselves consolidated Salazar as the political leader of Portugal 
(Antunes 1994: 16–17). He gradually centralized decision-making capacity 
to the extent he became known as the ‘financial dictator’ (Nunes 1930). In 
1932, he was appointed prime minister and initiated a constitutional project 
to establish the New State, which became the longest-lasting authoritarian 
regime in twentieth-century Europe.
The firsT years of The new sTaTe
The New State was a civilianized and corporatist authoritarian regime (Linz 
and Stepan 1996: 117) designed to enhance consensus among the ruling elites 
(Pinto 1994: 67–75). Nationalism, conservatism, Catholicism, ruralism and 
paternalism were markers of the regime identity (Medina 2000: 42). The New 
State was neither an extension of the military dictatorship nor a radical depart 
from it. The longevity of the New State was based on Salazar’s management 
of the balance between the elites rather than on his personal authority (Rosas 
1989). Nonetheless, during the 1930s Salazar gradually centralized power 
and worked to reduce the influence of the military that had helped install 
him (Almeida and Pinto 2003: 12–14). The Spanish Civil War and Second 
World War accelerated the process of personal empowerment. As well as 
being prime minister (1932–68), Salazar held other positions in government, 
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including finance (1928–40), war (1936–44), foreign affairs (1936–49), defence 
(1961–62) and served as interim President of the Republic in 1951. Although 
General Carmona remained the official president, executive power was held 
by Salazar (Campinos 1978). Officially, the prime minister was appointed by 
the president, who was in turn elected by the people in often unfair elections. 
However, Salazar effectively had the upper hand in the power relationship 
because he controlled the official party, the União Nacional (UN – National 
Union), which nominated the presidential candidates (Caetano 2000 [1975]: 
775–76). The chambers of the Portuguese parliament, the National Assembly 
and Corporative Chamber, had a merely symbolic role. Their legislative power 
was limited and were basically employed by Salazar, and later Caetano, as 
a divide-and-rule device and a source of internal and external legitimacy 
(Schmitter 1999: 81–90).
Despite the apparent similarities with the Franco regime in Spain and 
the surface of stability, the New State presented a rather complex situation 
in terms of civil-military relations. Franco’s and Salazar’s individual interests, 
experiences and inclinations left a clear imprint in the diverging civil-military 
relations. Franco was in a stronger position vis-à-vis the military than Salazar. 
Franco was a general who had won a civil war, completely purged his armed 
forces and maintained close contact with the military (Preston 1993). Salazar 
had been a student in a seminary before becoming a law professor who was 
appointed by the military. Moreover, he was a reserved man who maintained 
more distant relationships. Salazar did not succeed in completely subordinat-
ing the military, which periodically threatened his government. The Portuguese 
military held more political power and was more prone to intervene in poli-
tics than its Spanish counterpart. The rebellions in Madeira (1931), Marinha 
Grande (1934), on the Tagus (1936), Mealhada (1946), the abrilada revolution-
ary plot of 1947, the 1959 Sé rebellion, Botelho Moniz’s 1961 attempted coup, 
the 1962 rebellion in Beja and the 1974 Carnation Revolution, are probably 
the best-known expressions of military discontent and opposition, but there 
were more. The sheer number of military plots and coup attempts – up to 
twenty between 1926 and 1974 (Manuel 1995) – shows subordination was not 
fully achieved.
The military did not control the regime but it continued to occupy crucial 
positions in the government and administration. For instance 15.2 per cent 
of the members of the Corporate Chamber (Ferreira 2009: 345) and 26.2 per 
cent of the ministers had a military education (Almeida and Pinto 2003: 25). 
The military were also very well-represented in the censorship services 
(Gomes 2006), the GNR (Wheeler 1979b: 201) and the voluntary militia, the 
Portuguese Legion (LP – Legião Portuguesa) (Rodrigues 1996). During the 
early years of the New State the army was granted a large degree of autonomy 
as means to encourage it to support the regime (Ferro 2003 [1932–38]: 22–23). 
Salazar later became concerned by military political activity. He believed if 
they became used to civilian life they would gradually lose their esprit de corps 
and sense of discipline.
Salazar publicly advocated the professionalization, rearmament and reor-
ganization of the armed forces as means to remove the military from politics 
(Salazar 1935: 103). However, the evidence suggests that in practical terms 
Salazar was less concerned with developing military professionalism and 
modernizing the army than he was with co-opting their leadership to ensure 
they remained under his sway (Faria 2000; Wheeler 1979b). Salazar introduced 
a series of reforms intended to subordinate the military to his authority. 
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 4. Salazar personally 
drafted all documents 
related to the 
admission process and 
requirements for the 
High Staff Corps (PT/
TT/AOS/CO/GR-6, Folder 
4, Section 1, p. 223 and 
PT/TT/AOS/CO/GR-1A, 
Folder 20, Sections 
3–7, pp. 484–94). Even 
teachers at the Military 
School were directly 
appointed by the war 
minister. See Project 
of Decree-Law for the 
reform of the Army 
School (November 1940, 
aos/co/gr-1b, Folder 5, 
Section 14, pp. 301–2).
 5. In the 1930s, the young 
officers who had taken 
part in the 1926 coup 
were those who most 
strongly supported 
Salazar. These young 
officers had seen their 
careers obstructed by 
the inherited excess 
of officers from World 
War I and had blamed 
the senior ranks for 
the poor condition in 
which the Portuguese 
armed forces found 
themselves and the 
country.
 6. Regulations, 
instructions and 
handbooks with 
Nato doctrine 
were elaborated in 
collaboration with 
the officers that had 
attended courses 
abroad (Report from 
the Army Chief of Staff 
Barros Rodrigues, 1 
May 1953, PT/TT/AOS/
CO/GR-10, Folder 16, 
pp. 561–62). 
 7. For instance, 
Washington vetoed a 
Portuguese General, 
from attending 
the Nato Defence 
Committee, stressing 
that the committee 
had to be composed of 
civilian representatives 
(Confidential memo 
addressed to Salazar, 
29 Septemeber 1949, 
PT/TT/AOS/CO/NE-17–1, 
Folder 4, Section 41, 
pp. 181–83 and NATO 
Document, 5 October 
1949, PT/TT/AOS/CO/
In December 1937, ministerial approval became a condition for the admission 
to the elite senior staff corps (Decree-Law 2840) and a merit-based system of 
appointment (escolha) (Decree-Law 28402) replaced the traditional seniority 
principle for military promotions from the rank of captain upwards.4 At the 
same time Salazar reduced the military retirement age (Decree-Law 28404). 
The combination of these measures had an enormous impact on the control of 
the military (Pinto 1994: 288). Many of the senior officers who had questioned 
Salazar’s growing power were forced into retirement and replaced by younger 
officers whose allegiance to Salazar and his government was more secure.5 
Salazar rewarded his military supporters with important positions in the state 
apparatus in order to strengthen his hold on power. Fernando Santos Costa 
is the best example of this: in 1936, the army captain and one of Salazar’s 
former students was appointed undersecretary of state, and then, in 1944, war 
minister. Nonetheless, Salazar never achieved total control of the military in 
the same way Franco did. His authority continued to be periodically ques-
tioned to the extent that senior military officers led most political opposition 
movements: José Norton de Matos (1948), Manuel Quintão Meireles (1951), 
Humberto Delgado (1958) and Craveiro Lopes (1958–62).
The imPaCT of naTo membershiP
During the Second World War Salazar opted to declare neutrality and facilitate 
the action of the Allies. This strategy sought not only to honour the alliance 
with the United Kingdom but also to gain support among the senior ranks, 
which were traditionally pro-British and who considered Portuguese military 
material capabilities clearly insufficient to undertake an active role in the war 
(Ferreira 1992: 203). Due to its collaboration with the Allies, the strong anti-
communist stance of its government and strategic value of the Azores and its 
overseas ports in the context of the Cold War, Portugal was asked to become 
a founding member of Nato. The position of the armed forces was clearly 
in favour of Nato membership (Nogueira 1980: 142–44) and Salazar saw an 
opportunity to finally consolidate their subordination.
The integration into the Alliance in 1949 had special importance not only 
in terms of coordination and operational capacity but also in terms of civil-
military relations. Nato pushed the regime to adapt its defence structures and 
multiply the contacts with members of other more modern armed forces at 
different levels. The armed forces were reorganized within the new defence 
ministry. Nato allies, particularly the United States, supplied weapons and 
materials and contributed to the development of a Portuguese defence indus-
try, which facilitated the creation of a new modern expeditionary division 
stationed in Santa Margarida. Nato introduced a new doctrine, procedures, 
organizational techniques and methods of action.6 It also contributed to the 
idea that civilians should monitor military and defence issues.7
Most importantly, Nato requested improvements in the education and 
training of military cadres and specialists.8 As a consequence many officers 
were trained by US military staff while others went to military academies 
in the US and other Nato member states. These officers that had been sent 
abroad to be trained became known as the ‘Nato generation’. Through their 
international experience, many of them changed their negative opinions about 
the Western democracies. They soon occupied senior positions and influ-
enced successive generations of officers (Telo 1999: 84–85). The hundreds of 
officers trained abroad later trained thousands of other Portuguese officers, 
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NE-17–1, Folder 5, 
Section 3, pp. 253–56).
 8. Internal report of the 
Army General Staff, 30 
June 1953, PT/TT/AOS/
CO/GR-10, Folder 16, 
pp. 563–82.
 9. See references and 
comparisons to other 
Nato countries in the 
General Programme 
for the reorganization 
of the army (AHM, 
Division 1, Section 
39, Box 1, Number 1, 
Document 10).
 10. See for instance, the 
army report ‘The great 
problems of the army’ 
(January 1958, AHM, 
Division 1, Section 
39, Box 1, Number 1, 
Document 9). 
 11. See Telo (1996) and 
‘Chronicle of events 
of April 1974’ by 
Captain Salgueiro 
Maia in claiming Nato 
membership was one 
of the antecedents for 
the revolution, stating 
that the closer contact 
with the outside 
generated criticisms of 
the domestic situation 
(AHM, Division 1, 
Section 40, Box 1, 
Number 47).
 12. Captain Ferreira 
Valença’s report ‘A 
Abrilada 1961’ (1977) 
(AHM, Division 1, 
Section 39, Box 1, 
Number 1, Documents 
1 and 3) describes the 
unease of the military 
with the government’s 
stance on the colonies. 
See, e.g. Rebelo Sousa’s 
letter to Caetano 
(26 October 1968) 
(PT/TT/AMC/12–1549) 
and Caetano’s letter to 
Kaúlza (17 June 1970) 
(PT/TT/AMC/12–79) 
which highlights 
the problems 
between civilians 
and the military in 
Mozambique.
helping them develop a new understanding of their profession as well as 
new concerns and demands. Many of these officers criticized the regime and 
participated in opposition movements and conspiracies from the late 1950s. 
General Humberto Delgado is one of the clearest examples of this. Having 
spent five years in Washington as a military attaché in the Portuguese 
embassy and as representative in Nato, Delgado came back to Portugal and 
became the leader of the opposition to the regime, running for president 
in 1958. He was later exiled and finally assassinated by the regime’s secret 
police (PIDE – Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado) in 1965 (Cabeza 
Sánchez-Albornoz 1999).
The speed of the transformations encouraged by Nato slowed down with 
the outbreak of the colonial wars. The disagreements around Portuguese colo-
nial policy made the United States reduce the number of Portuguese officers 
in American schools. The United Kingdom, a traditional ally, also expressed 
discontent with Salazar’s colonial stance in relation to the country’s Indian 
enclaves (Oliveira 2007). In 1961 the United States apparently backed defence 
minister Botelho Moniz’s plot against Salazar (Mahoney 1983: 187–222). At 
the same time, Salazar decided to distance the Portuguese armed forces from 
the United States and Nato and reduced military cooperation and exchange 
with them. However, he did not manage to reverse the impact Nato had 
had on the military. Nato had contributed to diagnosing and revealing the 
serious structural problems of the Portuguese armed forces.9 Nato reforms 
made the military adopt a more critical stance towards their profession and 
to government policies.10 Many young officers lost part of their respect for 
their superiors and the government that maintained a more outdated vision of 
the armed forces. Overall, Nato was the cause of a quiet revolution (revolução 
serena) within the ranks, which became one of the triggers for the Carnation 
Revolution and the overthrow of the regime in 1974.11
growing disConTenT during The Colonial wars
The colonial wars aggravated the problems of civil-military relations. New 
corporatist claims, a change in the conception of authority and the heterogene-
ous composition of the armed forces contributed to the weakening of military 
discipline during this period. In 1961, Portuguese armed forces surrendered 
Goa, Damao and Diu to the Indian army and an independence war broke 
out in Angola. Guinea in 1963 and Mozambique in 1964 followed Angola. 
The military considered the government plans of maintaining all the overseas 
territories by sheer force as unrealistic and there were many complaints about 
the insufficient material conditions, lack of expertise and the negative treat-
ment the regime’s propaganda machinery was giving the armed forces, espe-
cially after the loss of India. In the colonies, the discontent was amplified by 
the large gap between the military’s and the white settlers’ salaries and by the 
difficulties of working outside the barracks.12
The emphasis on personal leadership rather than on hierarchical rank 
was accentuated during the colonial wars, albeit not to the advantage of the 
government. The colonial wars were fought by small units, and in most of 
the field operations there was no officer above the rank of captain. Loyal 
senior officers generally remained in Lisbon, far from the conflict zones, 
devoting themselves to administrative tasks. This weakened the authority of 
senior officers vis-à-vis mid-rank officers who had earned their reputation by 
fighting. Moreover, some military leaders in the colonies, such as Spínola in 
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 13. For instance in a letter 
to the defence minister, 
the undersecretaries 
of state of the air 
force, Kaúlza, and 
the army, Almeida 
Fernandes, warned 
about the process of 
‘proletarianization’ 
(24 June 1958) (AHM, 
Division 1, Section 39, 
Box 1, Number 16).
Guinea, Kaúlza in Mozambique and Luiz Cunha in Angola, exhibited caudil-
listic traits and did not follow a strategy fully coherent with government poli-
cies (Fernandes 2006: 162–66). The government also lost part of its authority 
with the replacement of Salazar by Caetano, who did not enjoy the popularity 
or legitimacy of his predecessor. Unlike Franco, Salazar had made no effort to 
groom a successor.
The Portuguese military was not as ideologically homogeneous and mono-
lithically supportive of the government as that in Franco’s Spain. Different 
ideological factions existed within the ranks.. The sociological composition of 
the armed forces had become increasingly diverse (Carrilho 1985). The Second 
World War had entailed massive recruitment and the mobilization of troops 
stimulating the influx of young militia officers with diverse backgrounds 
(many from urban areas) and political ideas (liberals, monarchists and social-
ists). The sociological composition of the Portuguese armed forces further 
diversified from the late 1950s due to Nato involvement and the colonial wars. 
Recruitment patterns changed when in 1958 Salazar, following Nato advice, 
abolished tuition fees in the Military Academy and offered salaries to cadets 
(Schmitter 1975: 16). Most of the officers who later plotted against Caetano 
had graduated after 1958 and their socio-economic backgrounds were modest 
(Porch 1977: 68).
Portugal required a larger army in order to fight the colonial wars. The 
armed forces grew from 40,000 men in 1961 to 217,000 in 1974; 149,090 men 
were mobilized in the conflict areas in addition to African regulars and militia 
forces (Teixeira 2004: 79). An extension of the period of military service was 
decreed, making military careers a less attractive means of social mobility for 
middle- and upper-middle-class youth. At the same time, the incorporation of 
middle- and lower-class officers contributed to the introduction of less conserv-
ative ideas that sometimes clashed with those of the regime and the senior 
ranks.13 Moreover, several regulations sought to attract and keep in service the 
militia officers (milicianos). They dominated the lower levels of the officer corps 
and were composed of many former university students, including some who 
had been actively involved in left-wing organizations since the 1960s (Maxwell 
1995: 37). The dissatisfaction originating in the economic disparities led many 
military to detach themselves from the government’s policies as well as from 
the white colonial elites, internalizing leftist and revolutionary ideologies and 
in some cases even sympathizing with the African insurgents.
CaeTano and The 25 aPril CouP
In 1968, Marcello Caetano, former professor and politician, was appointed 
prime minister after a domestic accident that left Salazar disabled until his 
death in 1970. Caetano’s reform plan, ‘renewal in continuity’ (renovação na 
continuidade) aimed at limited liberalization in order to revitalize the New State 
(González Hernández 1999: 34–35; Sánchez Cervelló 1993: 22–31). Caetano 
legalized some opposition movements, increased the powers of the National 
Assembly and, emulating Spanish governments, gave preference to civil-
ian technocrats over the military in his governments. Following the Spanish 
model of the 1960s, in 1971 Caetano recruited a new generation of techno-
crats, the ‘new layer’ (a camada nova) in order to reform the economy and 
political institutions. Policy-making became a more collective responsibility 
and the Council of Ministers gained relevance during Caetano’s rule (Graham 
1983: 224). However, these reforms were superficial and did not substantially 
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 14. The publication of 
General Spínola’s book 
Portugal e Futuroin 
in February 1974, in 
which he criticized 
the government, 
exemplifies the 
dwindling support 
for the regime from 
the senior ranks and 
the weakening of 
information control. 
Spínola and Costa 
Gomes were demoted 
for refusing to take 
part in a public act 
of endorsement 
of Caetano by 
senior officers on 
14 March 1974 (the 
so-called rheumatic 
brigade [brigada do 
reumático]).
 15. See for instance 
letters of complaint 
sent to Caetano by 
army officers from 
Guinea–Bissau (signed 
by 45 officers on 28 
August 1973) and from 
Mozambique and Évora 
(signed by almost 
200 officers, dated 13 
September 1973) (AHM, 
Division 1, Section 40, 
Box 1, Number 4). See 
also the ‘Chronicle of 
events of April 1974’ 
by Captain Salgueiro 
Maia (AHM, Division 
1, Section 40, Box 1, 
Number 47)
modify the regime (Graham 1993: 15; Lucena 1976: 185). The power struggles 
between different political streams weakened Caetano’s authority (Fernandes 
2006: 169–70; Rebelo de Sousa 1990: 66). The half-hearted reforms served to 
stress the latent contradictions of the New State and to point out that the 
radical substitution of the regime was the only solution to the institutional 
crisis (González Hernández 1999: 39).
Thirteen years of colonial wars in Africa had contributed to eroding support 
for the New State from some sectors within the Church, business and intel-
lectual elites (Sánchez Cervelló 1993: 20–21; Alexandre 2006). However, for 
Caetano, the most difficult challenge was to maintain the armed forces under 
control (Antunes 1985: 27). Caetano was less involved in the appointment of 
military chiefs than Salazar (Matos 2004: 175) and did not manage to control 
many of the important military leaders, including the president, Admiral 
Américo Tomás. Tomás was leader of the conservative faction, supporter of a 
strong stance on the colonies and responsible for Caetano’s appointment as 
prime minister (Fernandes 2006). Caetano’s government failed to respond to 
military claims and to settle the colonial conflict. During his rule the corpo-
ratist claims and discontent grew drastically. The military requested rights of 
association, increased salaries and pensions, earlier passage to the reserve, 
free public transport, longer holidays, better conditions for veterans disabled 
during the colonial wars, pensions for children and widows, elimination of 
the Senior Staff Corps (which was perceived as a caste system), and a better 
selection process in the Military Academy. Many of them, such as the influen-
tial generals Costa Gomes and Spínola, tried to transform the inevitable mili-
tary defeat into a political victory and requested a political solution along the 
lines of British and French decolonization processes.14 That solution may have 
reduced the levels of discontent in the armed forces and prevented the coup. 
However, in order to please the reactionary camp, Caetano chose to ignore 
those claims and sacked the reformist officers (Manuel 1995: 28).
An increasing number of episodes of military indiscipline due to disa-
greements with the colonial wars and corporate grievances took place during 
Caetano’s rule. The enactment of the Decree-Law 353/73 on July 1973, 
which aimed to enhance control of the armed forces by granting privileges 
to conscript officers, became a landmark in the deterioration of civil-military 
relations. The decree fostered academy officers’ discontent and internal frag-
mentation. A month later Decree 409/73 amended Decree-Law 353/73 but 
due to the continuation of protests it had to be finally revoked in October.15 
This incident showed Caetano’s weakness and inability to introduce changes 
in his military strategy. The government’s legitimacy was questioned and 
the loss of control of the situation was evident. Decree 353/73 became an 
excuse for the organization of career officers’ reunions in which the possibil-
ity of a military coup to end the dictatorship gradually became evident. The 
best-known examples of this were General Kaúlza’s right-wing conspiracy, 
neutralized in December 1973 and, most importantly, the left-wing coup of 
the Armed Forces Movement (MFA – Movimento das Forças Armadas) which 
finally overthrew Caetano.
The MFA, constituted in September 1973, was a clandestine progres-
sive movement of junior officers who conspired against the regime and trig-
gered the events of the Carnation Revolution. Initially, the MFA demanded 
Caetano revoke Decrees 353/73 and 409/73, increase military salaries and 
reconsider colonialist positions. However, in the MFA meeting in December 
1973 in Óbídos, some began to call for military intervention. Thus, captains 
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Vasco Lourenço and Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho were assigned to preliminary 
preparations for a hypothetical coup. On 5 March 1974, 200 MFA members 
met in Cascais and approved Major Ernesto Melo Antunes’s document ‘O 
Movimento, as Forças Armadas e a Nação’ (‘The MFA and the Nation’). The 
manifesto outlined a political programme known as the ‘3Ds’: democracy, 
development and decolonization. Caetano’s government failed to meet their 
demands. Changes in the military strategy were constrained by the highly 
legalistic institutional framework that slowed any reform and precluded more 
energetic actions to counter the imminent upheaval (Maxwell 1995: 44). On 
16 March, some soldiers rebelled in Caldas da Rainha, 150 of them were 
arrested. On 24 March, the MFA tasked Otelo with planning the military 
operations for a coup. Caetano underestimated the capacity of the rebels and 
tried to use them as a threat to counterbalance the influence of the reactionary 
groups that had obstructed almost any type of change in policies (Manuel 1995: 
26–27; Opello 1985: 65–80). Declassified documents from the International 
and State Defence Police/General Security Directorate (PIDE/DGS – Polícia 
Internacional e de Defesa do Estado/Direcção-Geral de Segurança) show that 
Caetano had information about the coup attempt at least one week before 
25 April (Porch 1977: 80–87; Opello 1985: 65–80; Manuel 1995: 26–27).
The coup eventually took place on 25 April 1974. Otelo led an operation 
carried out exclusively by junior officers. The MFA took control of Lisbon 
airport, radio and television broadcast centres, and the military headquarters in 
Lisbon and Oporto. Troops were moved all over Portugal to give the impres-
sion of a general uprising and the borders with Spain were sealed to avoid any 
kind of intervention by Spanish troops. This well-planned operation quickly 
succeeded. Caetano surrendered to General Spínola at the GNR headquarters 
in the Largo do Carmo in Lisbon. Many people came out onto the streets to 
celebrate the fall of the regime. Some clashes between police and youths took 
place before the morning of the 26 April when the secret police headquar-
ters, the last centre of resistance to the revolution, surrendered. Five people 
died as a result of gunfire from the DGS, these were the only victims of this 
otherwise peaceful revolution (Porch 1977: 90–93; Robinson 1979: 191–93). 
The New State had been overthrown by the same body that had enabled its 
creation: the military.
ConClusions
This article has shown that the military played a central role in most major 
political transformations in Portugal during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. The overthrow of the New State in 1974 was not an exception but 
the continuation of a trend of military interventionism that had started at the 
end of the age of absolutism. The military was never submissive vis-à-vis the 
civilian authorities and remained a source of concern for governments and 
political elites throughout the entire period analysed. Even after the fall of the 
New State the military were reluctant to give up their ability to shape political 
outcomes. They controlled the transition to democracy, and it was not until 
the abolition of the Council of the Revolution and the constitutional reform of 
1982 that the military finally accepted civilian supremacy and focused exclu-
sively on their defence function.
Although the Portuguese armed forces were always ready to intervene in 
politics during the periods studied, the triggering factors, as well as the nature 
and intensity of their participation, evolved. After the Napoleonic Wars the 
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military took a leading role in a process of regime change. The Napoleonic 
invasions and subsequent British protectorate had revealed weaknesses in the 
power structures in Portugal and the need for institutional change. Ideological 
polarization between liberals, who wanted to profoundly reform the state, and 
absolutists, who sought to restore the ancien régime, hindered political agree-
ments and the implementation of reforms. Both factions relied on the military 
to impose their views. The Civil War (1828–34) provides the clearest illustra-
tion of this confrontation. The instrumentalization of the military by contend-
ing factions also contributed to their politicization. The participation of the 
armed forces in politics was not transient. The military evolved from politi-
cal tools to independent political actors. The continuous pronunciamentos, the 
involvement of the armed forces in the drafting of laws and constitutions, as 
well as the fact that most governments were led by senior officers show that, 
in addition to the politicization of the military, Portugal experienced a process 
of militarization of politics.
After 1870s the military gradually distanced itself from the political parties 
and reduced its direct involvement in domestic affairs. Nonetheless, the colo-
nial stance of the government, which had to cede to British pressures and 
limit the expansion in Africa, became an important source of discontent. 
Military coups became less frequent than before, but new republican and 
nationalist ideas flourished in the ranks. The erosion of the monarchy and the 
rotating political system in place led to the 1910 revolution and the advent of 
the republic. This change of regime created once more a window of oppor-
tunity for the return of the military to the front line of politics. The military 
was quickly disillusioned by the political instability and institutional weakness 
and its interventions increased, some seeking revolutionary reforms, others to 
restore the monarchy. The First World War revealed the serious deficiencies in 
the Portuguese armed forces. The military realized that, in comparative terms, 
it was very poorly equipped and trained and that it was more effective fighting 
domestic enemies than external threats.
The republic was replaced by force by a military dictatorship in 1926. 
However, the patent inability of the military in government to solve Portuguese 
problems made it voluntarily hand power over to Salazar. The facade of stabil-
ity and endurance of his regime, the New State (1932–74), conceals a much 
more volatile reality in terms of civil-military relations. The military, which had 
initially appointed Salazar and granted him extensive powers, never completely 
accepted a subordinate role. Their latent interventionist thrust was frequently 
activated by political disagreements and unfulfilled corporatist claims. Salazar 
managed to neutralize all plots against him, but did not succeed in reversing 
the process of disaffection with the regime triggered by Nato membership and 
aggravated by the colonial wars. Again, contact with foreign armed forces had 
raised the awareness of the precarious working conditions of the Portuguese 
military. Moreover, the Portuguese military was quickly becoming more socio-
logically and ideologically heterogeneous. Many officers began questioning the 
political regime and its unrealistic stance on the colonial question.
Caetano, who was perceived as a much weaker leader, did not substantially 
change the policy direction. The prospect of a positive outcome in the colonial 
wars seemed increasingly remote. Most importantly, after the processes of 
decolonization by most Western powers, many officers questioned the legiti-
macy of Portugal’s stance on its African territories. The damaging economic 
impact of these wars on Portuguese finances made it extremely difficult to 
supply the much larger army required to control the colonies. The military 
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had to continue fighting regardless of its inappropriate material resources and 
training. Some of Caetano’s military policies, such as those seeking to attract 
and retain militia officers, fostered discontent among academy officers. The 
military decided to overthrow the regime, give up the colonies and focus on 
leading the transition into democracy.
Thus, the Carnation Revolution was not simply the result of a particu-
lar context of systemic failure and pressures from social movements, disen-
chanted elites and international actors. It was also the consequence of a long 
tradition of military interventionism deeply entrenched at the conceptual and 
institutional levels. Factors such as political instability and polarization, disa-
greements over foreign policy, the use of the armed forces against internal 
threats and deficient equipment and preparation nurtured the inclination 
of the military to interfere in politics. After the Napoleonic Wars the mili-
tary never retreated completely to the barracks. Military interventionism was 
either overt or remained latent until historical junctures such as changes of 
regime and wars activated it.
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